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RISK AND DISASTER: ARGUMENTS FOR A 
COMMUNITY-BASED PlANNING APPROACH 
David M. Simpson 
Abstract 
Using recent natural disasters in the San Francisco Bay Area 
as illustrative examples, this paper examines the general 
nature of disaster planning and traditional approaches that 
emphasize response and recovery aspects. For strategies 
focused on preparation, this process is for the most part cen­
tralized, located within structured government or organiza­
tional response networks, and neglects the individual and 
neighborhood levels. 
The author argues that planners must go beyond a focus on 
the traditional land-use mitigation strategies in pre-disaster 
planning stages, and give equal attention to the value of a 
bottom-up planning process. A model for this type of plan­
ning, using community and neighborhood-level groups as the 
primary vehicle for disaster preparedness activity, is briefly 
described. Examples of this process emerging in the Bay Area 
are also identified. Rnally, given the scant attention to com­
munity-based models of disaster preparedness, an agenda for 
further research is proposed. 
Introduction: Disaster in the San Francisco Bay Area 
Within a span of two short year.;, the San Francisco Bay Area has experienced 
two significant natural disaster.;. On October 1 7, 1 989, as the nation was tuned 
to a World Series game between the Oakland A's and the San Francisco Giants, 
the area was rocked by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. Almost two year.; later to 
the day, on Sunday, October 20, 1 991,  the cities of Oakland and Berkeley experi­
enced one of the wor.;t urban-wildland fires in U.S. history (now commonly 
referred to as the East Bay Firestonn). The Firestonn also received its fir.;t tele­
vision coverage from a sports event, as ashes from the fire eerily fell onto the 
football field across the bay in Candlestick park during a San Francisco Forty­
Niner.; game. 
Perhaps the most serious realization these two events produce is not the 
recognition of the loss of property or lives, but rather that these two events 
will happen again - and again. The San Francisco Bay Area is located in an 
active fault region, and conditions still exist in many parts of the Bay Area that 
invite a repeat of a similar firestonn. The tremendous forces of nature are 
oblivious to human settlements, and thus there are certain unavoidable conse­
quences associated with the urbanization of high-risk disaster-prone areas. 
Following a disaster, the historical trend is to rebuild - both quickly, and, 
for the most part, in a similar manner and location (Rubin 1 985). There are a 
variety of possible explanations for this phenomenon - some psychological, 
political, social, and cultural. Perhaps some of the strongest are the political 
and social pressures that drive rebuilding efforts, reflecting a strong desire to 
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return to nonnalcy. There are, without question, arguments to be made that 
the safest approach, in tenns of protecting lives and property, is not to build in 
these areas. Baning this politically untenable no-build option, however, the task 
remains as how to best cope with recuning disasters. Planners, perhaps to a 
greater degree than other professions, are more appropriate agents to prepare 
and plan for the destructive power of natural disasters. The tools and processes 
of land-use planning, emergency preparedness planning, and disaster-response 
planning can all play an important role in the reduction of life-threatening 
hazards. 
The following essay argues that what is needed and missing is a bottom-up, 
community-based approach to disaster preparedness. Such an approach is in 
contrast to the traditional planning approach to disasters found in the literature, 
which tends to focus on structural and regulatory processes as the primary 
means of mitigating natural hazards. The traditional focus is, for the most part, 
top-down and hierarchical, and neglects the positive role that community-based 
planning and preparation can play in overall disaster planning. With this per­
spective in mind, the essay will explore planning issues associated with natural 
disasters, using the recent earthquake and fire in the Bay Area as examples. 
The planning "gap" between the event and the first available public response 
will be examined, and examples of recently fanned community organizations 
in the San Francisco Bay Area are offered as possible models for other communi­
ties. Finally, a research agenda is proposed to address these issues. 
The Price of Disaster 
The cost of catastrophic natural disasters can be staggering, both in tenns 
of lives lost and property damage. And although it might be unnecessary to 
state the costs associated with disasters as an argument for better planning, the 
sheer magnitude of disasters experienced in the Bay Area are worth examining. 
The East Bay Firestonn and the Loma Prieta Earthquake are representative exam­
ples of the type of large-scale natural disasters that continue to pose a 
significant risk to residents in the area. The most recent disaster, the 
Firestonn, is described first followed by a brief description of the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake. A map of the region, including earthquake faults, is shown in 
Figure 1 .  
The East Bay Firestorm 
In the case of the East Bay Firestonn, an ember from a thought-to-be extin­
guished brush fire suddenly ignited on a Sunday morning. Aided by hot, gusting 
"Diablo Winds,"1 the fire exploded into an inferno that reached up to 2,000 
degrees Fahrenheit, incinerating almost everything in its path. Figure 2 is 
indicative of the total devastation of structures in the bum area. 
The intense heat melted cars, and in some cases melted gold kept in "fire­
proof'2 home safes. The fire burned for three days, destroying three square 
miles of Oakland and Berkeley neighborhoods. Twenty-five people lost their 
lives, many while fleeing the blaze. Over 3,000 homes were destroyed, and 
the damage has been estimated at roughly 1 .  7 billion dollars. 3 The area received 
a federal disaster declaration from President Bush on Monday, October 21 ,  
1991,  before the last flames were extinguished. 
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Fipre 1 
Map of Bay Area 
ACTIVE FAULTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 
Source: USGS/J.Schlocker, 1 970 
In the months following this disaster there were many instances of finger­
pointing and attempts to place blame. While there were numerous response 
problems and arguably legitimate mistakes made by public agencies, the fact 
remains that this type of fire is becoming more common as we begin to urban­
ize into wildland areas (lopez 1991) .  Called by some experts "the fire of the 
future," the fire risk is compounded in areas where the development expands 
into rugged hill terrain, where roads are narrow and winding. and where many 
houses have wood shingle roofs. 
H istorical records of the region demonstrate that this type of fire is not an 
uncommon occurrence. In the area of the East Bay Hills there have been 14  
fires since the devastating Bericeley fire o f  1 923.4 As recently as 1 970, a fire i n  
the Oakland hills destroyed 37 homes. As a result o f  that incident, a Blue Rib­
bon Commission issued a series of recommendations to deal with the fire haz­
ards, most of which were either ignored or implemented in a watered-down 
form (Staats and Cutler 1 991 : 51 ) .  The fire risk is still present in surrounding 
hill communities, where there is over 60 years of fuel accumulation in some 
areas. Continuing drought and the presence of uncleared brush and "duff," 
the accumulation of dead surface vegetation, mean that the area remains wl­
nerable to the risk of a similar fire in the future. 
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Figure 2 
Fire Destroyed All but Foundations in Burn Area 
(Matt Kondolf photo, 1 991 ) 
Figure 3 
Collapsed Section of Bay Bridge 
(BAREPP Photo, 1 989) 
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The Loma Prieta Earthquake 
Immediately following the lorna Prieta Earthquake on October 1 7, 1991, 
the media showed the world graphic images of destruction. A section of the 
Bay Bridge had collapsed; a large part of the Marina District in San Francisco 
was in flames; and the upper deck of the Cypress Freeway in Oakland had 
collapsed onto traffic below (see Figure 3, previous page, and Figures 4 and 5). 
I n  some ways these images may have exaggerated the initial perception of 
the severity of the earthquake to those outside of the area. Not all areas in the 
region experienced the same extent of damage. This is not to say, however, 
that the earthquake did not exact a toll on the Bay Area. After approximately 
1 5  seconds of seismic activity, 62 people lost their lives and an additional 3,757 
were injured. More than 12,000 became instantly homeless. Private property 
damage was estimated at $3.3 billion, and damage to public facilities was esti­
mated at over $2.3 billion. Over 1 ,000 homes and apartments were destroyed, 
and an additional 23,000 were damaged (BAREPP 1 990: 5). 
As with the East Bay Firestorm, perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the 
lorna Prieta earthquake is that, as destructive as it was, it was not "the big one" 
that is still anticipated in the East Bay area. The damage caused by this earth­
quake came from an epicenter located 65 miles southeast of San Francisco, in 
the Santa Cruz Mountains. An earthquake with an epicenter closer to areas of 
higher urban density is highly probable in the near future of the San Francisco 
Bay Area. The Hayward Fault (see Figure 1 )  runs underneath the heavily popu­
lated cities in the East Bay, from south of Hayward north through the cities of 
Oakland, Berkeley, and Richmond, and has been predicted as the faultline most 
likely to produce a major earthquake in Northern California (a 67 percent proba­
bility of a major earthquake within the next 30 years). A 7.5 magnitude earth­
quake on the Hayward Fault has some ove�helming implications, with esti­
mates of property damage in excess of $40 billion, casualties in excess of 4,000, 
and the number of injured ranging from 1 3,000 (requiring hospitalization) to 
over 1 00,000 (non-hospitalized) (CDC 1 987: 75-78). 
The combined damage of the East Bay Firestorm and the lorna Prieta earth­
quake for the region are significant: over $7.0 billion in directly measured dam­
age, with immeasurable amounts of economic disruption and psychological 
trauma. There were also 87 lives lost, over 4,300 homes destroyed, and an 
additional 23,000 homes damaged, all within a two-year period.5 
The actual damage associated with these disasters, and the potential costs 
of future recurring events, offers compelling reasons for putting measures and 
processes in place to mitigate these hazards. Before looking at the more tradi­
tional mitigation methods, the following sections address the concepts of risk 
and disaster planning. 
Risk Perception 
How do individuals and communities respond to natural risks in the environ­
ment? The construction and conceptualization of risk is a difficult thing to quan­
tify. At best, risk assessment and quantification can only be a general guidl' to 
public policy and planning. As several recent works in the field of risk have 
described, risk is fundamentally a socially constructed concept (see, for exam­
ple, Douglas and Wildavsky 1 983, and Priest 1 988). Its meaning remains depen-
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Figure 4 
First Story of Marina Complex is near Collapse 
(BAREPP Photo, 1 989) 
' -.· . .o>,- .,� c. , .. · .. . -. . ,.,li . - .. 1 .. ' ,;;:c -
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Figure 5 
Upper Deck of the Cypress Collapsed onto Traffic Below 
(BAREPP Photo, 1 989) 
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dent upon the cultural and political formulations of what risk is, what it means 
to mitigate for certain risks, and ultimately what value is placed on the legiti­
macy of that risk, which in tum determines the pressure for action to be taken. 
Risk evaluation then becomes the balancing of one risk against others in the 
community. The perception of vulnerability, the political salience of mitigation 
activity, and the willingness to commit funds all play a part in the evaluation pro­
cess. Depending on a community's experience with a particular hazard, action 
taken with regard to a specific risk is typically done by a planning department 
or elected public officials. The local level of perceived and actual risk will largely 
influence the associated amount of preparation undertaken by a community. 
The destructive forces of nature are nothing new, but they have become 
increasingly hazardous as urbanization continues into these high-risk areas 
throughout the United States. More and more people are populating areas 
susceptible to natural disasters, including such areas as the seismically active 
San Francisco Bay Area and Coastal California, the hurricane-prone Atlantic a­
nd Gulf coasts, and areas with an urban-wildland interface. For a variety of 
reasons, people have chosen to either accept or ignore the risks posed by the 
natural environment. 
General Disaster Planning 
As identified in the disaster planning literature (Foster 1 980, Drabek 1 981, 
Quarantelli 1 978, Rubin et al .  1 985, and others), a community that experiences 
any kind of disaster will go through a series of identifiable stages. The following 
four categories, while not exclusive, represent the types of activity that take 
place at various stages: 
Mitigation: activities to prevent or reduce impacts of a cata­
strophic event prior to its occurrence; inay include restric­
tive building codes, insurance, or pilblic education �orts. 
Preparedness: includes warning systems, hazard plans, 
maintaining resource inventories, storing emergency suppli­
es, or making structural changes (such as building retrofits). 
Response: search and rescue efforts; debris removal; and 
provision of essential resources, meaning food, shelter, and 
medical aid. 
Recovery: restoration and reconstruction of the community 
to approximate pre-disaster conditions. Emergency repairs 
are first, followed by restoration of repairable and restorable 
structures. Emphasis turns to replacing capital stock. Lastly, 
major construction contributing to the improvement of the 
community is often undertaken (see Rubin 1 979: 2-3). 
Thus the process of planning for natural disasters may be thought of as a 
"hazard cycle," as indicated in Figure 6. Each of the stages above (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery) is shown in relation to the approxi­
mate time the activity takes place. For areas with recurring phenomena, the 
cycle is more appropriately thought of as a closed loop, with recovery 
preceding the next event. 
Figure 6 
Hazard Cycle 
The Hazard Cycle 
EVENT 
Cr l l lcal 
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Period 
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The critical area often neglected by planners is the gap between prepared­
ness and response. Particularly in relation to catastrophic events, this is per­
haps a function of being "unwilling to plan for the unthinkable," meaning that 
initial chaos in such an event will be unmanageable, and therefore unplannable. 
In the case of a catastrophic event, the likelihood is that due to the overwhelm­
ing demands on the structured public response system, individuals and families 
will have to be self-sufficient for up to 72 hours (during Hurricane Andrew the 
need for individual stockpiles of supplies exceeded this 72-hour period). It  is 
during this chaotic period immediately following a large-scale disaster that 
community-based neighborhood planning and preparedness demonstrates its 
potential usefulness. 
Structured Response and Hierarchy 
For earthquakes and fires, there are a multitude of activities that take place 
in the hazard cycle mentioned above. Although space does not permit detailed 
comment on each of these activities, there are two general approaches to disas­
ter mitigation taken by governmental institutions. The first approach to mitiga­
tion is structural and legislative. By requiring certain kinds of activity (such as 
density limitations, zoning and subdivision regulations, adherence to seismic 
or fire safety building codes, or other requirements), hazards can be mitigated. 
These types of activity will be discussed briefly below. 
The second approach to mitigation of natural disasters emphasizes response 
plans. Much of current disaster planning focuses on how to best respond to a 
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disaster with an emphasis on advance planning - creating plans and checklists 
to be followed once a disaster takes place. The evolution and establishment 
of this approach is available in other sources (see, for example, Drabek et al. 
1 991 ), so it is not discussed here. It  is clear, however, that this process, while 
valued and necessary for most small-scale emergency events, breaks down in 
the case of larger-scale catastrophic events, and the top-down response­
oriented approach is not the optimal mitigation strategy in the immediate 
post-event stages. 
Comments on the Top-Down Planning Method 
The focus of disaster planning within state and local gover:nment institutions 
tends to be on the response and recovery aspects of an event. Emphasis is 
placed on being able to effectively ·respond once an event has occurred - to 
put out the fires, to rescue those in need, and to provide essential shelter and 
relief to area residents. Other activities focus on longer-term mitigation, which 
are discussed below, but are given a lower priority. 
The use of lengthy plans and checklists, a mainstay of disaster planning. are 
often written to satisfy regulatory requirements. Most have not had a significant 
test or simulation of a larger-scale disaster (many local emergency officials recog­
nize these plans are "boilerplate," meaning large sections are taken from exist­
ing plans, and are only slightly modified for local circumstances). It may be that 
the Multi-Hazard Functional Plan, as it is called, may look good on paper, but 
in the middle of a disaster such bulky plans are less likely to be used. 
Experience and the practice-oriented literature on disaster response also 
point to the possible problems of an "over-planned" response (see, for exam­
ple, lewis 1 988: 1 69-1 72) . By initiating too much structure and procedure, the 
response plan may not be followed simply becau$e it is not possible to predict 
all the needs and circumstances in a disaster. People will devise systems that 
get the job done, inventing new systems if necessary. Some 'flexibility must be 
maintained in the response process. 
Another significant problem in disaster planning by government institutions 
is the separation between "official" activity and the activity of individuals and 
volunteers. Relatively few communities have made any attempt to integrate 
the role of community-based organizations or volunteer groups into a broader 
official city response plan. Yet disaster research has shown there is a great 
propensity on the part' of individuals to help out in the time of a crisis. 6 
For these and other reasons, the top-down approach is only marginally effec­
tive in the pre-disaster stages, and perhaps most useful in later stages for fund­
ing resources and longer-term recovery activity. At the immediate response 
level, however, the system usually fails to work as planned, and the need for 
community-based planning and other mitigation measures becomes quickly 
apparent. 
Characteristics of Earthquake and Fire Disaster 
As disaster phenomena. there are some important differences that distin­
guish earthquakes and massive fires from other natural disasters such as flood­
ing or hurricanes. These characteristics make planning difficult and political 
support sporadic and difficult to sustain. While some of these elements are true 
in different ways for other disasters, those listed below are particularly true for 
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catastrophic earthquakes and fires such as the East Bay Firestonn. The more 
significant characteristics are summarized below: 
• There is a low frequency of events; 
• They are large-scale events, with high probability for extensive 
damage; 
• The timing is unpredictable - an event may occur at different times of 
the day when population densities are distributed differently; 
• The damage occurs almost instantaneously for earthquakes, and 
almost as fast in a firestonn; and 
• There is difficulty in waming a community during a large-scale fire, and 
it is currently impossible during an earthquake. 
The above aspects of these two types of disaster have important planning impli­
cations for both pre-event and post-event activity. In terms of preparation 
and hazard mitigation, there are other problems that are listed here briefly: 
• In community-risk-perception terms, the infrequency of events creates 
low level of interest and lack of institutional memory; 
• Preparedness has low political saliency and few organized 
constituencies; 
• More organized constituencies pressure against mitigation than for it 
(particularly when the cost of mitigation is placed upon the owners 
and developers); 
• The general community tends to think the government will take care of 
them, possibly evidenced by generalized apathy (see Jaffe, Butler, and 
Thurow 1 981 ); 
• The cost of maximum structural mitigation in many cases outweighs 
the benefits (in a calculus that discounts over a structure's lifespan); and 
• Public policy fonnation tends to be reactive, reaching implementation 
when an issue has reached a crisis level, or if a disaster has already 
occurred? 
These circumstances inhibit proactive planning and aggressive preparation 
strategies. The case of preparation apathy on the part of the public is not 
likely to be solved by governmental pressure. There are, however, some man­
dated activities that can aid in the mitigation of hazards in a community. 
Earthquakes, Fires, and Traditional land-Use Planning 
Given the geophysical aspects of earthquakes and urban-wildland fires, land­
use planning is an essential element in the minimization of risk of damage and 
injury. In recent years there has been an increasing body of literature focusing 
on land-use planning as one means of mitigating the hazards of an earthquake 
(see Jaffe et al. 1 981 ,  Mader et al. 1 988, Blair and Spangle 1979, Nichols and 
Buchanan-Banks 1 974, among others). One particular problem has been the 
inability to measure the effectiveness of these approaches, due to the infre­
quency of events and the difficulty in defining relative success (May and Bolton 
1986, and Jaffe et al. 1 981) .  Although this remains a debated issue, the general 
assumption can be made that land-use planning controls can be effective for a 
variety of natural disasters, if implemented strategically and with adequate 
political support. 
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Ideally a land-use planning approach should seek to mitigate two types of 
hazards: those associated with the event itself, and those associated with the 
secondary effects caused by the event. The primary geophysical hazards for 
which an earthquake is responsible are briefly summarized as being: 
• Fault displacement 
• Ground shaking 
• Ground failure (liquefaction) 
• Landslides 
• Flooding (by tsunamis or seiches) 
• Disruption of critical facilities. 
Those hazards associated with larse-scale fires may also be summarized as the 
following: 
• Complete burning and destruction of existing structures 
• loss of utilities (water, gas, and electric) 
• Burning and destruction of landscape and vegetative cover 
• Possible loss of habitats 
• Secondary hazards such as erosion and landslides. 
Each risk requires different considerations in the land-use planning process. 
Different areas of a community will be more or less susceptible to the variety 
of geophysical hazards a disaster can produce. Once these risks have been 
identified, there are a variety of approaches that a community can use to try to 
mitigate the effects of an earthquake or fire. These approaches are briefly 
outlined below. 
Land-Use Controls and Disaster Mitiption 
There are a number of land-use planning techniques that have the potential 
to reduce damage from a natural disaster. These controls exist in different forms 
in many states, and the application of these tools will vary from community to 
community. The following land-use controls are discussed within the context 
of available methods in California, where the two recent disasters occurred. 
The role of community-based planning is not restricted by any particular legisla­
tion, and therefore the model proposed later in this essay is transferrable to 
other communities outside of California. 
Although California has passed a number of state initiatives imposing certain 
requirements for earthquake hazard mitigation, 8 most of the responsibility 
rests with the local government. The same is true for fire ordinances, most of 
which fall under local jurisdictional control. Thus municipalities have a number 
of land-use tools at their disposal to control the development and redevelop­
ment of land within their jurisdiction. This section briefly outlines available 
mitigation methods a community may undertake for fire and earthquake risk. 
The General Plan 
One of the most basic tools available for mitigation is the general plan. As 
part of state legislated requirements in 1 972, each municipality must include a 
"seismic safety" element as part of its General Plan. 9 This requirement was 
later changed to the "public safety" element. to be more inclusive of other haz-
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ards. The public safety element requires the identification of risks posed to the 
community and requires that development goals and long-range plans be linked 
accordingly. The element also recommends actions assisting in the prevention 
or alleviation of hazardous conditions. A community might therefore have long­
range goals limiting development in seismically active or other high-risk areas. 
Zoning 
Zoning ordinances allow a community to restrict the development of areas 
near fault zones. State law ( 1 972 Alquist-Priolo Act) places restrictions on devel­
opment within one-eighth of a mile on either side of an active fault. But zoning 
has been more fully utilized by other communities to mitigate not only the prob­
lems of rupture along the fault itself, but also the secondary effects of liquefac­
tion, landslides, and other risks (see, for example, the zoning ordinances of 
Portola Valley, California). Thus, zoning can also be used to control densities 
on slopes and can also control the types of land use, (e.g., open-space designa­
tion or low-density residential development). 
It is important to realize that the behavior of structures on different types of 
soils and conditions will vary during an earthquake and should be reflected in 
the planning and zoning. Zoning ordinances must be developed that recog­
nize the hazards that will affect populations not directly located at the site of the 
natural hazard. An example might be the restriction of high-rise residential uses 
on susceptible alluvial soils. Other related techniques which might be consid-
ered are: 
· 
• Transfer of Development Rights (TDR): allow a developer to transfer 
densities from a high- to a low-risk area; and 
• Height and Bulk Provisions: these may help keep building failure 
within the lot area, and may prevent the blockage of the streets from 
debris (also true for fires). 
In high-fire-risk areas, many of the same considerations discussed above are 
equally applicable. Zoning ordinances can limit densities in designated fire­
risk areas. More importantly, zoning can control some of the hazardous condi­
tions that assist in the spread of a fire once it has started. Vegetative zoning 
can restrict the amount of accumulated undercover, as well as the type of vege­
tation that is permitted to grow.1 0  Zoning ordinances may also be used to 
restrict the use of certain fire-prone materials in housing. The use of wood 
shingles in wooded areas are an increased risk because embers are spread by 
the wind onto surrounding rooftops. Other zoning strategies might be: 
• Setback standards: allows for fire breaks; for earthquakes, may be 
applied to high-rise structures so that they do not sway into one 
another; and 
• Open Space and Consetvation Areas: may also be used as area-wide 
firebreaks; for earthquake areas, may be designated to prevent high­
density development in floodplain, landslide, and other high-risk areas. 
Subdivision Review 
Subdivision layouts may be reviewed for susceptibility to hazards, and 
developers required to redesign them if there are risks that have not been 
addressed. Adequate water supplies and hydrants, the design of streets (cui­
de-sacs are particularly troublesome for large fire-fighting vehicles), and emer­
gency access and egress must be taken into consideration for fire risks. For 
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earthquakes, land dedication requirements might also be used, such as open­
space dedication along a fault trace, or requiring alternative water sourt:es for 
post-earthquake fire control. 
Capital Improvement Planning and Construction 
The siting of public facilities ancf the planning of new infrastructure offer 
another instance where planning can mitigate natural hazards. Critical facilities 
such as police, fire, and hospital operations should be located away from earth­
quake hazard areas. For fire response, stations should be located so that fire­
fighters can reach a fire before it becomes unmanageable, which may mean 
having additional units stationed in places with terrain and conditions similar 
to the East Bay Hills. For both earthquakes and massive fires, the building and 
siting of critical eme'Bency response facilities should be decentralized and 
planned with an awareness of alternative routes for response in the event of 
road failures or blockage. 
New utility infrastructure should be planned to direct associated growth 
away from the highest hazard-prone areas. Infrastructure should also be 
designed to be more earthquake-resistant. This includes making connections 
more flexible, strengthening the lines where they cross faults, or creating redun­
dant systems to allow for expected line failures, which is also important for fire­
fighting. Placing all utility lines unde'Bround is another method of reducing 
hazards from la'Be-scale fires (e.g., falling power lines from burning poles). 
Backup generators for water-pumping stations and alternative water routing 
are possible approaches to assure water capacity. 
Building Codes 
Codes are a structural approach, focusing on engineering and design rather 
than land use. Local governments in California can either enfort:e the state 
Uniform Building Code for their seismic risk area (Zones 1 through 4), or seek 
more stringent requirements. Fire codes can be used to require such things as 
interior sprinklers and smoke detectors. In either case, inspections are a cru­
cial component of this process. 
Public Notification 
This process is more reliant on the private market to achieve effectiveness. 
Although its usefulness has been questioned, it remains as a possible alternative 
(see Palm 1 981) .  Municipalities can require the notification of owners of the 
seismic and fire risks· as part of the real estate transaction process. The 
Alquist-Priolo Act requires realtors to inform buyers of the seismic risks of 
properties within the zone areas. The same could be done with fire-prone 
areas. The environmental review process can also alert developers and 
municipalities to the seismic risk and secondary hazards that would either be 
caused by the development, or which would place the project at risk. 
Effectiveness of Traditional Approaches 
The effectiveness of the land-use planning approach is la'Bely dependent 
upon when the ordinances took effect and whether the local community is 
willing to make the investment to enact them, both in time and capital. If 
there is new construction, or if there is redevelopment, then these techniques 
can be effective in minimizing damage. In older, urbanized and predominantly 
built-out communities, however, where there is already substantial construction 
in hazardous areas or there is construction that pre-dates newer fire- and earth-
1 10 
Risk and Disaster, Simpson 
quake-resistant building codes, mitigation techniques are more costly and more 
difficult to implement. 
Mitigation techniques in these communities may involve the retrofit or rein­
forcement of existing buildings, taking action on properties at the point of sale 
(to require reinforcement, to reduce densities near a fault zone, or to purchase 
properties to remain as open space), or require renovation as a prerequisite 
for rezoning or other permit processes. 
There is ongoing debate in the disaster-planning literature as to how effective 
many of the mitigative techniques are in the event of a large-scale disaster (see, 
as one example, May and Bolton 1 986). The general assumption, lacking good 
causal relationship data, is that mitigation attempts are beneficial to some de­
gree, and that this is better than no attempt at all. Further debate results when 
trying to attach specific cost-benefit analysis to different mitigation strategies. 
Regardless of the effectiveness of any one particular mitigation measure, it 
is clear that no one technique or set of techniques will prevent the damage 
resulting from a catastrophic event. The magnitude of these larger-scale disas­
ters requires a re-thinking of how we plan for the immediate post-disaster 
stages of a catastrophic event, as described in the next section. 
Arguing for a Community-Based Approachl l  
As previously . discussed, the typical disaster planning paradigm has two 
primary components: pre-event planning, and post-event response. The pre­
event planning includes those mitigation techniques described in the land-use 
approach sections. Pre-event planning also includes the creation of response 
plans and procedures to be implemented in the event of a disaster, such as 
the multi-hazard functional plan. Post-event response includes the ability to 
carry out the multi-hazard functional plans, and the ability to provide immedi­
ate search and rescue activity, medical services, and relief services such as 
food and shelter. 
Referring once more to the Hazard Cycle in Figure 6, there is a gap between 
preparedness planning and response planning. In the event of an earthquake, 
it is generally assumed that individuals and neighborhoods must be prepared 
to support themselves for up to 72 hours. This is because essential services 
will not be available (phone, water, power) for an unknown period time. Local 
governments will be overloaded, and it may take several days to mobilize and 
respond to all of the areas that require assistance. 
For the additional reasons described in previous sections, the top-down 
approaches are susceptible to breakdown because of "over planning, • system 
overload or collapse, and the fact that new systems will be invented on the 
spot to take care of immediate needs. Key personnel may be at home and 
may not be able to reach the command center. 
To meet community needs during this 72-hour period, an alternative plan­
ning framework must be considered. The emphasis should be on the individ­
ual, neighborhood, and community-based organizations to provide the "first­
responder" capability during this crucial period. Without a guarantee of govern­
mental assistance within a specified period of time, the local community must 
be prepared to meet their own needs. 
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The use of community-based organizations and local neighborhood groups 
as the focus of initial response makes sense from a number of perspectives. 
The first is simply cultural. Local organizations are able to communicate with 
residents who might not be proficient in English. Communication with non­
English-speaking populations was found to be a problem by disaster assistance 
teams following the Loma Prieta earthquake. Information can be more effec­
tively communicated using the speaker's first language in an appropriate cul­
tural context. 
The second is local awareness. Neighborhood groups are more likely to be 
aware of who in their area has special needs, such as residents who are hearing­
or sight-impaired, physically disabled, or otherwise might require assistance. 
Neighborhood groups can assist in the evacuation of these residents, or identify 
their location if a rescue is needed. Awareness also means knowing where the 
resources are in their area (who in the group has tools, or medical training), 
and familiarity with the buildings so that utilities can be shut off for people 
who are away from their homes. 
Finally, there is the ability and necessity for these neighborhood groups to 
be effective first-responders. Residents in a neighborhood are logically closest 
to the local needs. With basic training in emergency first aid, fire suppression 
techniques, and simple search-and-rescue procedures, the local residents can 
accomplish vital response activities in the initial phase of the disaster. As an 
example, in the Firestonn there were cases of residents who stayed in the area 
and fought smaller brush fires or hosed down structures while firefighters con­
centrated on the major fires. 
Proposing a New Framework 
A new disaster-planning paradigm should incorporate a more comprehen­
sive, integrated approach to the preparation for and response to a disaster, 
while recognizing the vital role of neighborhood and community organizations 
in all stages. At the present, most of the literature and research is focused on 
either long-tenn mitigative strategies (land-use approaches), or more effective 
response planning (multi-hazard functional plans and similar response activity). 
These two approaches are driven by governmental institutions, and have 
deficiencies associated with the political processes - for example, decisions on 
the allocation of resources under pressure from various interest groups. The 
existing disaster-planning paradigm also neglects the immediate needs of indi­
viduals and neighborhoods in the critical gap between the event and response. 
This is where the greatest need will be, and also where the community and 
neighborhood groups can provide immediate assistance. 
A new paradigm should emphasize and link the role of community groups 
and individuals in a fully integrated approach (see Figure 7) that incorporates 
community and neighborhood organizations together with the traditional gov­
ernmental institutions and responses, private sector response, and existing 
relief organizations that will typically respond to a disaster. 
Integrated Disaster Planning 
The planning and activity of these groups should be coordinated and inte­
grated into a comprehensive response strategy. That does not mean a cumber­
some, fixed-response plan, but rather an overall strategy that recognizes the 
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flexible nature of response in a disaster, and highlights the key communication 
and coordination functions. Each of the four groups must play an active and 
coordinated role in  preparedness and initial-response planning. The inclusion 
of a community-based response function in the planning process is a relatively 
new concept for earthquake response, and could be equally applied to other 
disasters such as fires, floods, and hurricanes. The manner in which this com­
munity-based preparation might take place is discussed below. These commu­
nity organizations are then integrated with the city's response plan, assisting as 
first responders, assessing damage, and taking care of the immediate local 
needs. 
Models for Community-Based Disaster Response 
Given the trauma that has taken place in the San Francisco Bay Area, it is 
perhaps not surprising that solutions for the response-planning gap have 
already begun to emerge. Several of the Bay Area communities and neighbor­
hoods realize that they will be responsible for their own needs immediately 
following a disaster. These groups offer a model for other communities, and 
also reinforce the idea that research and planning should begin to address this 
type of bottom-up organization strategy as being equally important in the 
disaster-planning process. 
The community groups that are briefly described in this context have several 
common elements. There were initiated by proactive and concerned individuals 
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and neighborhoods, and were not created by the local governments, although 
many have gained some support and staff time to assist their efforts. The groups 
were organized in order to respond to disaster needs in their own neighbor­
hood and local area. finally, they were initially organized without local finan­
cial support, although in some cases groups were given funds to expand a 
pilot project. The next section describes a sample of these organizations. 
SNAP, CORE, ALERT, and NEAT 
Another common element among these groups is an easily recognizable acro­
nym to describe their organization. "SNAP" stands for "Sunnyvale Neighbor­
hoods Are Prepared. • Sunnyvale is a medium-sized city in the South Bay. The 
community organized itself into 12 sections, with neighborhood section bound­
aries defined by relative proximity to a local elementaJy school. Each section 
conducts a workshop on response, and inventories the skills and resources of 
the members in the section (for example, who has chainsaws, ladders, medical 
training. or other skills or equipment). Each section is also integrated into a 
communication network with the other sections and with the city (CB or ham 
radio contact). 
In the city of Oakland, groups were formed around existing neighborhood 
crime watch associations. The organization is called CORE, or "Citizens of 
Oakland Respond to Emergencies. • The original effort was designed to train 
individuals in the city's 26 neighborhood associations and ten city departments. 
This first effort, a pilot program, was called Neighborhoods and Employee Earth­
quake Selfhelp Program (NEESP). Coordination of the program is now based 
in the Oakland Office of Emergency Services. 
Training for the CORE groups is divided into three modules that are offered 
sequentially. The first module is "Individual and family Survival."12 The module 
focuses on preparation, identifying home hazards, the stockpiling of supplies, 
and evacuation procedures. The second module, "Organizing Response 
Teams, • explains how to organize local volunteer response teams, how to select 
an operations center, and how to assess the group's needs and available 
resources. The final module is called "Advanced Citizen Response; and deals 
with the more advanced training needed for first aid, fire suppression, and light 
search and rescue procedures. CORE offers the module training not only to 
neighborhood groups •. but also to community organizations and individuals. 
In the nearby city of Albany, citizens have fonned "ALERT, • which stands for 
"Albany Local Emergency Response Teams. • The fonnat is similar to SNAP, with 
groups organized at the neighborhood level. Neighborhood areas have team 
leaders and each area maintains an inventory of resources and contacts. ALERT 
is less than a year old, but intends to expand into more intensive training for 
the neighborhood groups. The impetus for the organization was in response 
to the threat of earthquakes, and this serves as the focus of the groups. 
North of Albany is the city of El Cerrito, which has fonned a program called 
"NEAT." N EAT, which stands for "Neighborhood Emergency Assistance Teams; 
is organized much like the CORE program in that it is an attempt to coordinate 
neighborhood action for a range of emergencies, including earthquakes and 
fires. Due to topography and vegetation, El Cerrito has fire risk similar to that 
in the Oakland Hills area. 
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Education is an essential element in these neighborhood programs. Mem­
bers in these groups are made aware of the risks in their community and neigh­
borhood, and are instructed in ways to prepare for their own home and family 
first. These activities include making sure the entire household understands 
evacuation procedures, has food and water stockpiled, and takes individual 
action to improve the safety of their home - including activities such as brush­
clearing or structural modifications. 
Each city and community has different needs and will design its program to 
meet those needs. Generically, however, under a community-based response 
model, a neighborhood response organization should: 
1. Develop orpnizational units along existing boundaries. These 
boundaries might be defined by crime watch groups, neighborhood 
associations, or tied to local elementary schools, which are often the 
local designated shelter in a disaster. 
2. Focus on educational and preparedness programs using a bottom­
up approach. This is accomplished by educating and preparing the 
indi vidual first, then the family, the block, and the neighborhood. 
3. Provide basic emergency response skills. At. a minimum, training 
should be made available for disaster first aid, basic fire suppression, 
and light search and rescue. Cities might sponsor "train the trainer" 
programs, training individuals to return and train the members in their 
own neighborhood groups. 
4. Have local groups inventory their block needs and their available 
resources. This will identify those individuals with special needs and 
will also indicate where additional resources might be located (e.g., 
who has tools, such as a chainsaw or ladder, or specialized experience 
and training). 
5. Establish alternative communication networks. Alternative 
communication links will need to be established (either by CB or Ham 
Radio) in the likelihood that phone service will not be available. 
6. Integrate groups into a city-wide response plan. These groups will 
be a valuable asset in the event of a disaster, and thus should be 
integrated into the city's official response plan so that officials can 
make use of trained volunteers, and have contact points within each 
neighborhood block. 
The key to community-level response planning is the development of realis­
tic response strategies that can be carried out under adverse conditions. They 
should be basic, easy to understand, and clearly understood by all participants 
prior to a disaster. The confusion and panic that will follow immediately after 
a disaster will not permit "on-the-job" learning of the response plan. If it is 
not understood or followed, then there is the probability it will be dropped 
altogether, and an ad hoc system will develop in its place. If some degree of 
flexibility is not planned into the response system, then any ad hoc response 
has the potential to be wasteful of both resources and manpower. 
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Areas for Future Research 
Given the disasters described above, and considering the damage caused by 
the most recent Hurricanes Andrew and l niki, the need for additional research 
into these areas is readily apparent. There is a need for planning-oriented 
research in a wide variety of contexts. Considering a model that focuses more 
on community-based preparedness and neighborhood groups, there are four 
main topics deserving of more thorough research. These are briefly described 
below. These topics should be considered to be part of a larger research agen­
da, one that has an overall goal of creating more integrative and community­
inclusive models for disaster planning, along the lines expressed in this paper. 
Community-Level Risk Perception 
The first research area is the perception of risk at a community 
level, or, in other words, to what degree is a community aware of 
the natural hazards in its area, and what is the community's will­
ingness to organize or pay for mitigation and preparedness plan­
ning? Current risk literature focuses almost solely on the individ­
ual and the individual's willingness to pay (fisher et al. 1989). 
Risk and Hazard Communication to the Community and Individual 
What are better methods for communicating the natural hazard 
risk in a given region? The few studies that have looked at this 
aspect have found that people do not trust the government in 
disseminating risk information, and tend to believe it more if it 
comes from the media, or by word of mouth (Peny and Greene 
1 983). There also appears to be a sense of "fatalism" in some 
cases, so that people feel that it is simply fate if something hap­
pens. In other cases, the fear of a risk is irrational in proportion 
to the actual danger (Kartez 1 989). Better and more effective 
strategies for risk-information dissemination need to be 
studied, perhaps borrowing from other fields (FEMA 1986, in 
addition to the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program 
(NEHRP) publications). 
The Use of Neighborhood and Community-based Organizations 
While there is a recognition in the disaster literature that organ­
ized neighborhoods tend to perform better in disaster and crises 
situations, more research would assist in determining the best or 
most appropriate design of these groups. In what type of neigh­
borhood will some designs work better or worse than others? 
Where possible, it would be helpful to conduct pre- and post-dis­
aster research on existing community groups. How do you inte­
grate the community groups into a comprehensive city-wide re­
sponse plan? Why do some groups continue, while others fade? 
Disasters and the Role of Planners 
116 
Perhaps more than any other field, the planning profession 
should be taking the lead on disaster planning and related 
issues. In general, this is not the case. The majority of dis­
aster-related research is being conducted within the field of 
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sociology, while the field of psychology deals with many 
aspects of risk awareness and perception. Planning research 
has primarily focused on the variety of land-use mitigation 
techniques and their relative success. Planning researchers 
should examine the nature and role of planning in disasters 
from a broader and more comprehensive perspective. 
Conclusion 
Natural disasters are traumatic, frightening, and destructive events. Unfortu­
nately, we must continue to contend with them, and seek ways to minimize the 
impacts. As we continue to urbanize high-risk areas, the damage and loss of life 
will increase unless we take a proactive and aggressive approach to all areas of 
mitigation, preparedness, and response planning. A fully integrated approach 
is needed, with equal emphasis being placed on a "bottom-up" preparedness 
strategy using a framework of neighborhood and community-based organiza­
tion. 
Planners and the planning profession can and should play a central part in 
the creation and maintenance of preparedness and response plans. Planning 
academicians should continue to look at the costs and benefits of alternative 
strategies, the role of the community, and the formulation of risk perception 
and its effect on planning practices. The emphasis must be turned toward a 
more integrative and comprehensive planning approach, yet one which incor­
porates some degree of flexible response. 
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NOTES 
1 The Diablo winds are hot, dry winds associated with high-risk fire conditions, and are 
the Nonhern California equivalent of the Southern California 'Santa Ana• winds. 
2Most home safes are fire-rated for 1 ,5500 degrees Fahrenheit, which is not exceeded 
in the more typical home structural fire. 
3statistics taken from the Alameda County Sheriff's Depanment, Office of Emergency 
Services, 'The 1 991 East Bay Hills Firestorm: After Action Repon,' dated February 
1 992. 
4The 1 923 fire, aided by the Diablo Winds, burned out of control and was I!XIinguished 
'only by an act of providence,' burning over 1 30 acres and 584 homes throughout the 
city of Berkeley. Taken from 'A Summary of Fires in the East Bay Region,' draft repon 
from the East Bay Regional Park District, undated. 
5Prior to the recent damage from Hurricane Andrew in southern Florida, this was the 
highest amount of sustained damaged to a region within such a shon period of time. 
f>rhere is an abundance of anecdotal evidence of heroics in the East Bay Firestorm and 
lorna Prieta eanhquake by individuals who were volunteers and not pan of any 
'official' response, yet performed lifesaving and dangerous tasks. 
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7 Much of the California legislation passed immediately following an earthquake, notably 
in 1 925 (Santa Barbara), 1 933 (long Beach), 1 971 (San Fernando), 1983 and 1 987 
(Coalinga and Whittier Narrows), and most recently 1 989 (Loma Prieta). This offers 
the conclusion that there is a "window of opportunity" in which to push for statewide 
measures in the aftermath of a disaster (see also Olsen 1980, and Blair and Spangle 
1 979.) The same is true following urban fires, with the passage of many ordinances in 
Southern California which restrict wood shingles and other vegetative zoning. There 
have also been ordinances implemented by the city of Berkeley following the East Bay 
Firestorm. 
&Examples are the 1 933 Field Act (seismic standards for public schools); the 1 971 
Hospital Seismic Safety Act (standards making hospitals earthquake-resistant); the 
1 972 Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act (projects within a bounded zone of an 
active fault must be accompanied by a geologic report. in addition to other local 
requirements); and the 1 986 Unreinforced Masonry (URM) Buildings Act, which 
requires municipalities to identify all URMs and establish a mitigation program for 
them. 
9california Government Code, Section 65302(f). 
1 Din the East Bay Firestorm, it was apparent that eucalyptus trees are a fire hazard, in 
that they bum rapidly and contain an oily resin that gives off toxic smoke, making 
firefighting more difficult. The area had also ecperienced a freeze in the previous year 
that left many of the trees dead or dried out, and increased the rate at which they 
bumed 
1 1  Some elements of this framework were first presented in a conference paper by 
Simpson and Collignon, 1991 .  
1 2Descriptions of the CORE training modules are taken from a bulletin entided "CORE: 
Citizens of Oakland Respond to Emergencies," published by the Oakland Office of 
Emergency Services, CORE program, undated 
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